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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) are increasingly common in our society, and can be found in applications such as battlefields and
national security. These devices can also be targeted by attackers and hence, they are a valuable source in digital forensic
investigations. In addition, incriminating evidence may be stored on an IoT device (e.g. Amazon Echo in a home environment and Fitbit
worn by the victim or an accused person). In comparison to the IoT security and privacy literature, however, IoT forensics is relatively
under-studied. IoT forensics is also challenging in practice, particularly due to the complexity, diversity, and heterogeneity of IoT
systems. In this paper, we present an IoT based forensic model that supports the identification, acquisition, analysis, and presentation
of potential artifacts of forensic interest from IoT devices and the underpinning infrastructure. Specifically, we use the popular Amazon
Echo as a use case to demonstrate how our proposed model can be used to guide forensics analysis of IoT devices.
Index Terms—Digital Forensics, Internet of Things, IoT Forensics, Amazon Echo Forensics
F
1 INTRODUCTION
I N an Internet of Things (IoT) setting, the number of smartdevices connected to the Internet can range from a few to bil-
lions. Such devices are often able to sense their environment (e.g.
temperature, humidity and wind speed) as well as interconnecting
and communicating with each other [1], [2], [3]. According to
Juniper research [4], more than 20.4 billion smart devices will
be connected to IoT by the year 2020, generating approximately
£134 billion annually by 2022 for the IoT cyber security industry.
This is telling of the IoT trend in our society, which is also
evident by IoT being extended to sectors such as battlefields and
military (e.g. Internet of Battlefield Things and Internet of Military
Things)1.
In 2017, it was reported that users of Bose headphones were
being spied upon without their consent [5]. Specifically, a plaintiff
filed a complaint against Bose for their Bose Connect application,
which allegedly collects data on the music and audio books,
that their users listen to, and sends the collected information to
a third-party data miner (Segment.io). In the same year, Vizio
[6], a Smart TV manufacturer, was also allegedly monitoring over
11 million smart TVs, where user data were being sent to other
third parties without user consent [6]. Specifically, they monitored
the pixels displayed on the TV screen and matched these to
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movies stored on a database. This technique is known as automatic
content recognition (ACR). Vizio was subsequently fined a total
of USD$2.2 Million by the US Federal Trade Commission, and
was also ordered not to track their users [6]. In addition, the
organization was ordered to delete all their existing data relating to
this incident (e.g. near-by access point details, postal codes, and
the Internet protocol address (IP Address) of the local network,
and implement a privacy policy.
In general, an IoT system consists of IoT devices, IoT in-
frastructures, services and applications, and interface to other
applications or services, which can be organized into four layers
as shown in Figure 1:
1) Sensing layer, which includes sensing devices to sense
and acquire information, such as smart sensors, radio-
frequency identification (RFID), and end components of
IoT;
2) Network layer, which is the infrastructure to support
connectivity to Internet and other devices;
3) Service layer, which provides and manages services to
users or other applications; and
4) Application-interface layer, which provides interface to
users or other services.
It can be expected that the increasing popularity and pervasive-
nesss of IoT devices will be targeted by attackers to compromise
our systems or exfiltrate our data, and gain a competitive advan-
tage. In other words, any IoT device such as a 3D printer, a smart
switch or a smart bulb in a smart home environment can potentially
be compromised to gain access to the smart devices or the user’s
personal data [1], [3], [7], [8]. In 2016, for example, distributed
denial of service (DDoS) attacks targeting the Domain Name Sys-
tem (DNS) provider, Dyn, was carried out by a botnet comprising
a large number of 2.5 million compromised IoT devices (e.g. IP
camera, smart printers, and home WiFi gateway) [2], [9]. In the
past two years, a large number of vulnerability scans targeting IoT
devices have been reported. It was also reported that nearly 65% of
today’s IoT devices are insecure [10]. This is not surprising due to
the challenges in designing efficient security and privacy solutions.
In other words, security and privacy solutions designed for IoT
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Fig. 1. General IoT Architecture
devices will have to take into consideration the interoperability
and complex ecosystems, as well as the computational limitations
in IoT devices.
Hence, IoT devices are likely to be sources of evidence in a
cyber security investigation (e.g. investigation of a DDoS attack)
[11]. Unlike conventional digital forensics (e.g. mobile device
forensics), the diversity in IoT devices (e.g. 3D printers, roadside
units in a smart transportation system, smart healthcare devices
in a hospital, and smart military uniforms) and the different
evidence and privacy regulations compound the challenges of such
investigations [12]. Some of these challenges are as follows:
• Identification: identification of potential evidence in IoT
environment can be challenging, particularly if the inves-
tigators are not familiar with the types of IoT devices
present as well as the underpinning infrastructure;
• Preservation: once the potential source of evidence is
identified, then the question is how can we acquire and
preserve the evidence from the IoT devices, companion
application, IoT services, networks in the IoT infrastruc-
ture, and so on, in a forensically sound manner; and
• Analysis: depending on the format that the evidence is
acquired, analysis of the acquired evidence may be chal-
lenging. We also have to ensure that the analysis takes into
consideration data provenance and the interaction between
IoT and cloud servers that facilitates the aggregation and
processing of data from the IoT.
The following major contributions are presented in this paper:
1) We propose an IoT based forensic analysis model, which
supports the identification, acquisition, analysis, and pre-
sentation of potential artifacts of forensic interest from
IoT devices and the underpinning infrastructure;
2) We address IoT devices forensic investigation processes
from the forensic perspective, in which each IoT devices
are expected to provide important forensic artifacts;
3) We analyse forensic artifacts retrieved from the popular
Amazon Echo as a use case to demonstrate how our
proposed model can be used to guide forensics analysis
of IoT devices.
In this paper we present an IoT forensic model (see Section 3)
and demonstrate how it can be used to guide the investigation of
IoT devices, using Amazon Echo as a case study in Section 4. In
the next section, we will briefly discuss related literature.
2 RELATED LITERATURE
In recent years, IoT forensic has attracted attention from the
forensic community [13], [14], [15], [16], for example in wearable
devices [17], smart vehicles [18], smart home devices [19], and
so on. Approaches may vary between the nature and type of
digital forensic investigation. For example, at the IoT network
layer, network forensics tools or methods are generally applied.
We refer interested readers to the work of Caviglion et al.,
who reviewed popular digital techniques in network forensics,
reverse engineering, and so on, as well as the prevalent data
storage formats and files systems [20]. Key challenges were also
briefly discussed [20]. In another related work [14], the authors
categorized IoT forensics into three zones: IoT zone, network
zone, and cloud zone, where each zone consists of different areas
and forensics analysis activities.
In [21], the authors presented an automated forensic manage-
ment system (FEMS) that was designed to collect data from a
three-layered architecture, namely: perception, network, and ap-
plication layers. However, in dynamic IoT networks, it is difficult
for FEMS to investigate all states of the IoT devices. Zawoad et
al. proposed a forensic-aware IoT (FAIoT) model which allows
collected evidence to be stored in a secure evidence repository
server [10]. In [15], Orlando et al. described the methods to
investigate the device’s hardware and the relevant system (e.g.
operating system, boot loader, remote installation and commu-
nication system). In addition, a detailed security measurement
for IoT devices was provided. In [22], a general IoT forensics
framework was proposed, comprising a forensic state acquisition
(FSAIoT), and a centralized forensic state Acquisition (FSAC) to
classify the evidence acquisition of IoT devices into three modes
(i.e. controller to IoT devices, controller to cloud, and controller
to controller) [23].
There have also been research efforts in smart home devices
and the forensic of such devices. For example, Amazon Echo is
increasingly used as the voice controller hub of smart sensors
and devices, which plays a centric role in bridging different smart
home devices and the amazon cloud server. The Amazon Echo
is activated by wake words like ‘Alexa’, but must also constantly
listen for the wake-up command, and clearly this is a potential
evidence source [16], [19], [24]. For example, Chung et al. [25]
explained how companion clients (i.e. devices used to send and
capture commands and responses from intelligent home assistants,
such as Alexa) can also be a source of evidence.
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Fig. 2. Proposed IoT Forensic Model
A number of device fingerprinting techniques have also been
developed, which can be used for the investigation of IoT devices.
For example, sensor pattern noise (SPN) can be used to identify the
source device that has acquired a digital image or video, and this
is relevant for the investigation of IoT devices that have a image
or video acquisition capability (e.g. unmanned aerial vehicles).
In SPN based image forensic analysis, as the most dominant
part of SPN the photo response non-uniformity (PRNU) noise
can be extracted from an image to build image fingerprint and
camera fingerprint, which has been widely used in image origin
identification and image forgery detection. Flicker forensics can
also allow an investigator to identify an IoT device by analyzing
the flicker signal and associate the parameters with some internal
characteristics of the particular device [26].
In the next section, we will address our IoT forensic model.
3 PROPOSED IOT FORENSIC MODEL
When we conduct an IoT forensic investigation, we have to
consider the sources of evidence other than the actual IoT devices,
for example, the sensing, network, service and interface layers (see
Figure 1).
Similar to conventional digital forensics, IoT forensics mainly
consists of the following four stages: identification, preservation,
analysis, and presentation [27].
1) In the identification stage, the focus should be on IoT
devices (e.g. sensors and intelligent home assistants such
as Amazon Echo), and any related infrastructure (e.g.
routers).
2) In the preservation stage, we may require specialized
/ customized tools to acquire data from (proprietary)
hardware and applications.
3) In the analysis stage, customized forensic tools may
be required to analyze data from certain devices, other
than the typical commercial forensic tools (e.g. EnCase
and FTK). Both EnCase and FTK are commonly used
forensics tools that can be used in digital security, security
investigation, and e-discovery.
4) In the presentation stage, forensic investigators will need
to detail the findings and be able to articulate the analysis,
findings and their implications in a court of law. Mean-
while, the evidence items should be presented with their
original format.
Building on the typical four-stage digital forensic process, we
present an IoT forensic model – see Figure 2. Specifically, our
model starts from an offense classification stage, where the roles
of IoT are classified into IoT as a target, IoT as a tool, and
IoT as a witness. Then, each related device and the companion
apps are examined using the above four-stage process. In addition,
all acquired forensic artifacts are stored in an encrypted evidence
repository.
3.1 Offense Classification
Due to the diversity of devices and heterogeneity of networks
in an IoT setting, it can be challenging to identify all sources
of evidence and collect all relevant forensic artifacts in a timely
fashion, especially if third parties or remote servers (e.g., websites
and cloud servers) are involved. Firstly, to effectively identify
the devices for an investigation, it is important to consider the
nature of the offense (e.g. a serious and organized crime type
will generally mean that more resources should be spent on the
case), data acquisition methods, and relevant laws (e.g. what are
the elements of proof) and regulations. In general, the IoT-related
crimes can be group into three classes [28]:
(1) IoT device as a target (e.g. cyberattacks where vulner-
abilities in IoT devices are exploited). Many IoT devices are
resource limited (e.g., computation capabilities, storage space,
power supply, etc.), and most security tools/packages cannot be
installed in IoT devices, which make them an easy target for cyber
attacks.
(2) IoT device as a tool, IoT devices can be used by forensic
investigators as tools to identify, collect, analyse, or even present
evidences in digital investigation. For example, a compromised
IoT device is been used to facilitate other malicious activities such
as a botnet attack.
(3) IoT device as a witness (e.g. data stored in the IoT
device can directly implicate an individual accused of a crime),
in which IoT devices are able to identify, collect, and preserve
evidential data for forensic investigation. One prominent example
involved the Amazon Echo, where an Arkansas man was accused
of killing his friend. The prosecutor then sought recordings from
the defendant’s Amazon Echo to be used as evidence [29]. IoT as
a witness will likely happen again in the future frequently because
IoT devices are now an integral part of our daily life.
Figure 3 shows the workflow of IoT device identification,
in which an IoT device will be examined using the appropriate
approach.
3.2 IoT Device Identification
In this stage, we seek to answer the following questions:
• What was/were available at the event/crime scene or a
remote site?
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Fig. 3. IoT device identification procedure
• Who and what was/were there when the event/crime oc-
curred?
• What are the constraints in collecting the required evi-
dence?
• What is the minimum set of evidence required to support
the elements of proof for this specific offense?
A six-step IoT device identification method is presented in
Figure 4.
• Define device space, to identify the devices relating to the
specific case;
• Establish the device lifecycle, to identify the time span for
the device examination;
• Establish access, to identify the accessibility of the de-
vices, including confidentiality, authentication, authoriza-
tion, and so on;
• Define data categories, to define the data category that the
device can provide;
• Network access control, to identify the connectivity of the
networks relating to the device and isolate the device from
the connections;
• Identify the access to devices, this stage summarizes
previous steps and establish the availability of the device
for investigators.
Despite the diversity of IoT device manufacturers, IoT de-
vices share some similar features and capability. In general, an
IoT device consists of a processer or micro-controller, read-only
memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), communication
module (Bluetooth, Wireless, Zigbee, etc.), and data input/output
interfaces. To record the collected or generated data, an IoT device
may be equipped with built-in secure digital (SD) memory to
support removable memory. Software features of an IoT device
include operating systems (some simple IoT devices may only run
very simple code without an operating system), middleware, file
system, and applications. Many IoT devices do not have a specific
file system and in this case, the investigator may need undertake
further research, for example how to leverage the application
software development kit (SDK) to obtain more information.
Conventional digital forensic tools, such as DD, EnCase, FTK
Imager, and SIFT, may also be useful in some cases. In IoT
forensics, the data extraction tools/methods can be classified into
five levels, namely: manual, logical, hex dumping/JTAG, chip-off,
and micro-read [30]. For IoT devices that are not supported by
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Fig. 4. IoT Devices identification in IoT Forensics
TABLE 1
Example of Hardware Characterization for IoT Devices
Hardware Features Capabilities Evidence Sources
Processor 48MHz to 2 GHz Cache
Microcontroller Less than 52MHz RAM and FLASH
Memory 5MB to 128GB Chip Memory and
Card slots MicroSD, MicroSD SD-based Card
Display LCD to HD –
Camera Still, Video DF/SD Card, ex-Memory
Interfaces SPI, I2C built-in RAM/SRAM
JTAG JTAG Scanner –
Input Interface RS232 to Keyboards –
Voice Input Voice recognition EEPROM, ex-storage
Positioning GPS receiver External storage
Wireless IrDA, BT, WiFi, NFC –
Battery Li-Ion Polymer –
existing forensic tools, the investigator could also consider seeking
the cooperation of the device owner, reviewing seized material,
seeking the assistance of the service provider (e.g. Amazon in the
case of Amazon Echo), and so on.
3.3 Evidence Preservation
Tables 1 and 2 show the potential avenues for data preservation,
and in this paper we will focus on memory forensics. Specifically,
we will focus on (1) extracting data from the memory of a
target IoT device; and (2) analyzing the physical memory data
(from RAM), page file (or SWAP space) data, etc. Swap space
denotes areas on disk used for interchanging contents between
main ram and secondary memory, in linux swap is an actual disk
partition and in windows machine, the swap space is a pagefile. In
digital forensics, Swap file is a rich source of key evidence items,
including passwords, sensitive data, encryption keys, etc.
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TABLE 2
Example of Software Characterization for IoT Devices
Software Features Capabilities Evidence Sources
OS Closed Android, iOS,etc.
Secure coding Programming language RAM and FS
Logs Events logs, data logs FS, ex-storage
PIM Calendar, List FS, storage
Applications application data Cache, RAM, FS, ex-S
Data type Application-based Cache, RAM, FS, ex-S
Call Logs File systems
Data Processing depends Cache, RAM, FS, ex-S
Email Applications RAM and FS
Protocols Communication Cache, RAM, FS, ex-S
Web Web browser Cache, RAM, FS, ex-S
Web Network services Cache, RAM, FS, ex-S
Live memory evidence extraction is another major issue in
IoT forensic preservation. In resource-constrained IoT devices
(e.g. limited computation, storage, energy supply, etc.), volatile
memory extraction can often be conducted to extract key evidence
stored in the RAM or an ongoing communication session [31].
A number of memory acquisition tools have been developed
in the literature, such as the Android based memory subsystem
(ashmem) [32], Android low memory killer [33], and memory grab
[34].
However, there are still challenges in live memory acquisition.
For example, the memory protect unit (MPU) technology only
allows specific instructions or code to access the memory. This
prevents the forensic investigator from accessing the memory.
In addition, anti-forensics (AF) techniques including activities to
overwrite data and metadata compound the challenges of memory
acquisition. For example, TimeStomp2 can be used to overwrite
NTFS create, modify, access, and change times-
tamps [35].
Also, while a number of tools have been developed for live
memory acquisition from computers and laptops (e.g. Winen, dd,
dumpit.exe, winhex, nigilant32, memoryze, readline), there are
limited tools designed for IoT devices.
2. https://www.offensive-security.com/metasploit-unleashed/timestomp/,
last accessed June 20th, 2018
3.4 IoT Forensic Analysis and Presentation
IoT forensic analysis can be scenario- and device-specific, since
IoT systems can have different configurations and settings. For
example, in a smart home system as shown in Figure 8, the
devices involved may differ from an industry IoT (IIoT) systems.
The general approach can include attempts to reconstruct the IoT
crime/event scenes. The findings of the analysis also need to be
documented and presented, for example to the jury, prosecutors
and judges.
4 AMAZON ECHO (PI) FORENSICS
Amazon Echo is a popular intelligent home assistant or ‘smart
home’ IoT hub, which takes voice commands from the users to
control itself and other connected IoT devices/sensors (e.g. smart
lights, smart kettles, smart locks, smart thermostats, and smart
doors) [36]. Using the voice recognition technology (i.e. Alexa in
the case of Amazon Echo), users can interact with the connected
IoT devices using their voice. Clearly, the devices require some
sort of Internet connection (e.g. WiFi) [16].
In a prior work involving the analysis of Amazon Echo [25],
it was reported that the user’s history data and interactions with
Alexa are stored in the SQLite database and web cache files.
The authors analyzed two Amazon Echo Dots, with Android
4.4.2 + Alexa app, iOS 10.1.1 + Alexa app, OS X 10.10.5 +
Chrome and Windows 10 + Chrome. For the network analysis, it
was determined that most of the communications were encrypted
and the JSON format was used for passing parameters. The
authors’ analysis of the communications revealed undocumented
API calls to RESTful Web services. In other words, there are
seven categories of data on the device, namely: account, customer
setting, Alexa-associated devices, skills and behaviours of user,
user activity, and etc. The researchers found that most of the data
contain UNIX timestamps, which could be used to create timeline
of activities within an investigation [25]. Within this applications,
the utterance API could be used to download voice files [37].
The location of the client artefacts depends on the access
method being used, such as for SQLite databases on iOS and
Android, and within Chrome caches for OS X and Windows 10.
A summary of these locations is presented in Table 3.
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TABLE 3
Location of client artefacts [25]
OS Application Path Format Description
Android 4.4.2 Alexa 1.24.11760
/data/data/com.amazon.dee.app/databases/map data storage.db
/data/data/com.amazon.dee.app/databases/DataStore.db
/data/data/com.amazon.dee.app/app webview/Cache/*
SQLite
SQLite
WebView cache
Tokens of an active user
Todo and shopping list
Cached native artificats
iOS 10.1.1 Alexa 1.24.11760 [iTunes backup]/com.amazon.echo/Documents/LocalData.sqlite SQLite Todo and shopping list
OS X 10.10.5 Chrome 55.0.2883.87 /Library/Cache/Google/Chrome/Default/Cache Chrome cache Cached native artifacts
Windows 10 Chrome 55.0.2883.87 %UserProfile%/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/User Data/Default/Cache/ Chrome cache Cached native artifacts
Fig. 6. Alexa Pi firmware images created using Encase 7.0
Fig. 7. Data type related to Amazon Echo
On Android device, the SQLite files are contained in
map data storage.db (token information for the current user,
and is deleted when the user signs out) and DataStore.db. For iOS
device, there is a single file named LocalData.sqlite. While the
Android analysis was fairly easy, the iTunes backup protocol had
to be used in iOS analysis. The chrome access data was found
stored in the data-block-files, which could be possible to rebuild
Alexa-related caches into the first HTTP headers, and cached data.
This could be useful for determining user behaviors as the stored
things (e.g. user clicks) can lead to calls to Alexa APIs [37].
In IoT forensics, analyzing embedded files and data with
firmware images is an effective way. By connecting the UART port
in Echo, the boot debug messages can be output to a terminal.
In our research, we determine that Echo uses u-boot as its
boot loader, which is a popular open source bootloader and a
number of commands/tools can be used to extract information
in the firmware. In this paper, we use the Alexa Pi to build an
Echo over Raspberry Pi Version B, which uses similar firmware
with Amazon Echo. In our experiment, we analyze the Alexa Pi
over Ubuntu (16.04), the companion app installed on an iPad
4 (iOS 12), and the Alexa Voice Server (AVS). In [38], an
AlexaPi is developed to monitor and control devices in smart home
environment.
We first use u-boot to output the firmware in Alexa Pi, which
results in three Encase images (see Figure 11).
4.1 Data Type
We then analyze the data type created, transmitted, processed, and
stored on the IoT devices. For an Amazon Echo and the AVS
service, we determine that the following (see also Figure 7):
• Device related data include device name, device group,
serial number, hardware data, timezone, region, etc.
• Connectivity includes connection address, WiFi: Gateway
IP, IP, media access control address (MAC address), Server
address, Bluetooth address, etc.
• User data include data related to the IoT device, such as
username/password, language, calenders, and email.
• Application data include Host name, Client version, Pro-
ductID, ClientID, ClientSecret, Device Reg name, Bearer
token, registered user, etc.
• Other data include communication data, specific protocol
type, etc.
4.2 Alexa Pi Data Acquisition
1) Data acquired from the companion app include device related
information, account, and network, as shown in Figure 8. For each
IoT device, more detailed data can be extracted using both logical
and physical methods, including device name, wifi, device register,
serial number, and MAC address. In addition, information such as
language and location can also be extracted directly after further
analyzing the app.
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Fig. 8. Data extracted from the companion app (partially)
Fig. 9. Alexa Pi fireware file system
The bootloader’s command line interface allows raw access
to part of the memory areas and Flash integrated circuit (IC).
When processing the bootloader message via the universal
asynchronous receiver/transmitter (UART) port, an investigator
can obtain the location of the kernel image and scout the firmware
by using the u-boot command-line interface (CLI). In further
examination of the file system in the firmware, Debian system
information can also extracted as shown in Figure 10.
We use Zenmap to locate the IP address as: 192.168.0.10
and MAC address AC:63:BE:78:98:D6 of an Echo via a ping
scan. In more complex investigations, we can also use port pings
to find all ports open on the devices. By checking the IP address
and MAC address, the investigator can identify other IoT devices
that need to be examined.
Through the UART, we can dump the firmware to an image
file. In this investigation, it is very difficult to solder the UART
to the USB ports. Fortunately, in [39], an Echo image is provided
that can be loaded via a raspberry pi, which works fine as an Echo
device. We investigate the images on the Raspberry Pi, which
contains the information that an Echo has.
Some information to identify the device can be found by
investigating the firmware. Amazon requires each Amazon Echo
Fig. 10. Alexa Pi configuration for AVS
device to provide the productID (also known as Device Type
ID), ClientID, and ClientSecret in order to use AVS. The Echo
firmware contains several files within the root folder, for example
in the automated install.sh file.
4.3 Examination and Analysis
The two devices’ information are shown in Figure 12. For each
device, information such as device name, wireless connections,
device register, serial number, and MAC address are located and
analyzed. For example, the Setting section stored within the
Alexa app contains information that can be used to identify the
IoT device. In other words, the investigator can extract the device
name, the Wi-Fi that the IoT device had previously connected to,
Bluetooth connection information, and paired device. The ’device
is registered to’ information may also be used to identify the
owner of the Echo, for example in collaboration with Amazon.
Meanwhile both serial number and MAC address can be used to
identify the Echo and other connected devices.
Echo uses an address set in the Alexa companion app, where
the location information is used to provide weather forecasting and
location-based services. Analysis of location information acquired
from companion devices (e.g. Google Maps, Find your device, and
weather) can also be corroborated with other analysis.
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Fig. 11. Firmware analysis using Autopsy
The location data extracted from settings shows the where-
abouts of the user. It also provides the geolocation data (e.g.
address, postcode) that the user was searching for. However,
during the analysis, the investigator also needs to check the history
to get more context of the search request.
Amazon Echo is also capable of storing private conversations
in the home, or other non-verbal indications that can identify who
is present in the home (e.g. based on audible cues). However, in
this stage we are only able to identify the recordings streamed by
Echo from the user’s home activated by the wake words. The text-
transferred recordings are stored on both Amazon Alexa Server
and Alexa companion app.
The device time zone is key to identifying data with an associ-
ated timestamp. In our further examination of the firmware, the de-
vice time zone can be used to validate the access/modify/creation
time of files like .wavtemp. The wake word and language are also
key to analyzing the history. Since the default wake word is Alexa,
the investigator can also find the user-defined wake word, if any.
When examining the companion app and the firmware, we also
located 5163 audio files (e.g. stop.mp3 and error.mp3), which can
indicate the last operating time of the device (see Figure 11).
Figure 11 also shows the keyword search results. In this
example, keywords such as amazon, echo and mac were used
and 288, 206, and 144 results were found respectively. There
are also 1584 potential email addresses located, which may
contain the user accounts or potential passwords for logging to
the AVS. In fact, we locate the login id with the corresponding
password that can be used to login to the AVS, as shown in
Figure 12. To further analyze the services that Echo provides,
network forensics tools can be used to scan the open ports and
potential services. In our examination, we use Zenmap with
command {nmap -T4 -A -v 192.168.0.10} to scan the
ports. We note that ports 80, 5200, 515, 427, 10001,
631, and 9100 are open. These open ports are very useful
in analyzing the connection behaviors of Echo and can be used
to trace the behaviors of the user. Using command {nmap
-sV -T4 -F 192.168.0.10}, we found the services pro-
vided by Echo, including http, svrloc, printer, ipp,
jetdirect, et al.Two additional services are also found
using service fingerprints, and one of these two is shown in
Figure 13.
The collective findings (from different devices, etc) are then
pieced together.
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In IoT forensics investigation, evidence can be collected from IoT
devices, internal network, applications, or outside cloud server,
which makes it very challenging to identify evidences from the
IoT systems. Basically, IoT forensics involves three levels: device
level, network level, and cloud level. The heterogeneity in the IoT
presented many challenges in terms of IoT forensics,
1) Identification of IoT devices and Data location, poten-
tial evidences may reside in the IoT devices, network
infrastructures, and cloud server, it is very challenging but
crucial to identify the devices and locations that potential
evidences reside;
2) Data type and its lifespan, the data formant and type
in IoT systems are very different for different type of
devices, so it is very important to make sure the data will
be returned to original format before performing forensic
analysis. Specifically, it is very challenging to collect,
process, analyse, and present data from live sources (e.g.,
ram, cache, etc.) in an appropriate way that acceptable in
law court;
3) Cloud level forensics, most IoT applications are delivered
as services in cloud platform, in which the evidence can
be distributed across different cloud servers that would be
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Fig. 12. AVS website logged using the found login id and pwd from firmware
Fig. 13. Unrecognized services found in the images
outside of the investigator. Meanwhile, the dependence
of forensically data on cloud level forensics require more
powerful tools for forensic analysis.
Actually, there are still some extra challenges need to be ad-
dressed, such as security lack, device type, attack scenarios, etc.
to develop methods/tools for IoT investigation.
IoT forensics will be increasingly important, as more devices
around us are connected to the Internet or some form of networks
(e.g. a private home or office network).
In this paper, we presented an IoT forensic analysis model
and demonstrated how it can be used to guide the investigation of
an Amazon Echo. There are a number of challenges that need to
be addressed. For example, how do we address the large storage
requirement associated with the search space? How do we keep
pace with new IoT devices, in terms of our forensic capabilities
and the potential for anti-forensic measures to be deployed?
Future research will also include evaluating our proposed
model on a broader range of IoT devices and in cloud zone.
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